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THE ENRICA LEXIE AND ST ANTONY: A 
VOYAGE INTO JURISDICTIONAL 
CONFLICT 
DANIELLE IRELAND-PIPER* 
The decision of the Supreme Court of India in Republic of Italy v Union of 
India illustrates the legal and diplomatic complexities that can arise when 
nations, and states within those nations, have competing claims to 
jurisdiction over the prosecution of criminal offences.  In our increasingly 
interconnected world, competing claims to jurisdiction are more likely.  The 
decision, among other things, is concerned with legal aspects of coastal 
state jurisdiction in a federal system and sovereign immunity under 
international law.  This decision is of interest because Australia, like India, 
is a coastal nation that divides power between federal and state 
governments.  This case note sets out the factual background and legal 
frameworks that gave rise to the decision, considers the arguments made by 
each of the parties before the Supreme Court, and summarises the findings 
of the two presiding Judges.  It then seeks to understand the relevance of the 
decision and any lessons that can be taken from it. 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
The decision in Republic of Italy v Union of India (‘Indian Fishermen Case’)1 by 
the Supreme Court of India dealt with legal aspects of coastal state jurisdiction 
and sovereign immunity under international law.  In so doing, it illustrates the 
legal and diplomatic complexities that can arise where nations assert competing 
claims to jurisdiction.   
The decision concerned an incident between the M V Enrica Lexie, an Italian 
merchant vessel, and the St Antony, an Indian fishing boat.  On board the M V 
Enrica Lexie were members of the Italian Armed Forces (‘marines’), authorised 
by Italian law to deploy on the vessel to protect it from pirate attacks.  On 15 
February 2012, two of the marines are alleged to have mistaken the St Antony for 
a pirate vessel and opened fire.  The shots fired are alleged to have caused the 
death of Valetine Jelastine and Ajeesh Pink, two Indian fishermen on board the St 
Anthony (‘fishermen’).  The incident took place at a distance of about 20.5 
nautical miles from the coastline of the State of Kerala (‘Kerala’), a unit within 
the federal Union of India (‘India’). The M V Enrica Lexie was flying the Italian 
flag. The St Antony was registered as an Indian vessel, but was not flying the 
Indian flag at the time of the incident. The Republic of Italy (‘Italy’) and Kerala 
                                               
*  LLB/ BIR (Hons) (Bond), LLM (Hons) (Cantab), PhD candidate at the University of 
Queensland, Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, Bond University. The author acknowledges 
the efforts of her research assistant, Gordon Connor McBain.  
1  Supreme Court of India, Civil Original Jurisdiction, Writ Petition (Civil) No 135 of 2012.  
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each commenced criminal proceedings against the marines under their respective 
domestic laws.   
At the time of writing, the case is ongoing and the circumstances surrounding it 
are still the subject of media coverage.2  Nonetheless, the decision by the Supreme 
Court remains relevant and instructive because of the findings on jurisdiction and 
the questions of international law it raises, some of which may be the subject of 
debate among both practitioners and academics.  As M Ghandi observes, if the: 
[L]egal issues relating to the Enrica Lexis incident, including extraterritorial 
jurisdiction, are taken before an international adjudicatory forum, a different 
decision could emerge given that the subject matter of the dispute involves certain 
grey areas of international law.3 
The decision is complex and required the Supreme Court to consider Italian law, 
Indian law, Kerala’s state law, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (‘UNCLOS’),4 the decision of the Permanent Court of International Justice in 
S S Lotus (France v Turkey) (‘Lotus Case’)5 and general principles of 
international law.  The Supreme Court accepted the argument by Italy that Kerala 
did not have jurisdiction, but rejected Italy’s argument that India did not have 
jurisdiction.  It held that the marines should be tried by a Special Court in India.6  
However, the Chief Justice indicated that some of the arguments raised by Italy 
could be reopened if, as a matter of evidence, it was accepted by the Special Court 
that the marines had acted on the belief that they were preventing an act of piracy.  
This was because art 100 UNCLOS requires that ‘[a]ll States shall cooperate to the 
fullest possible extent in the repression of piracy on the high seas or in any other 
place outside the jurisdiction of any State’.  
The decision is relevant for two primary reasons.  First, it illustrates the 
complexities that arise in managing jurisdictional conflicts7 and deciphering the 
relationship between international and domestic law.  In particular, Chelameswar 
J in his judgment makes observations about the nature of extraterritorial 
                                               
2  See, for example, Shubhajit Roy, Italian Marines Case: Unlike Other Murder Accused, 
Marines Enjoy Access to Internet, Phones (27 April 2014) The Indian Express (Online) 
<http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/the-plight-of-italian-marines-family-visits-
cafe-outings/>; India Drops Anti-piracy Marine Charges (24 February 2014) Al Jazeera 
(Online) <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia/2014/02/india-proceed-with-italian-marine-
case-201422453431308731.html>.  
3  Manimuthu Gandhi, 'The Enrica Lexis Incident: Seeing Beyond the Grey Areas of 
International Law', (2013) 53(1) Indian Journal of International Law 1, 25. 
4  United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature 10 December 1982, 
1833 UNTS 3 (entered into force 16 November 1994).  
5  S S Lotus (France v Turkey) (Judgment) [1927] PCIJ (ser A) No 10. 
6  Under the Special Courts Act 1979, cases in India involving persons of high public or political 
office can be transferred to a Special Court. A Special Court consists of a sitting Judge of a 
High Court nominated by the Chief Justice of the High Court within the local limits of the 
jurisdiction in which the Special Court is situated, with the concurrence of the Chief Justice of 
India. 
7  See, for example, the discussion in Danielle Ireland-Piper, ‘Extraterritorial Criminal 
Jurisdiction: Does the Long Arm of the Law Undermine the Rule of Law?’ (2012) 13(1) 
Melbourne Journal of International Law 122, 125. 
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jurisdiction.  Second, Australian jurisprudence could benefit from a deeper 
understanding of Indian jurisprudence.  As Michael Kirby has observed:  
Australian lawyers do not know enough about India. I warrant that the opposite is 
also true ... The neglect by Indian and Australian lawyers of each other is as tragic 
as it is puzzling. It is tragic because it represents a lost opportunity for two 
common law countries, which are federations, which live by the rule of law, which 
are governed under democratic, parliamentary constitutions and which, in their 
different ways, protect fundamental human rights and basic freedoms … [B]etween 
India and Australia there are so many links of concept and legal theory that we owe 
it to each other to become more familiar with relevant fields of jurisprudence so 
that we may take advantage of the experience which each has to offer.8 
This case note sets out the factual background and legal frameworks that gave rise 
to the decision in the Indian Fishermen Case, considers the arguments made by 
each of the parties before the Supreme Court, and summarises the findings of the 
two presiding Judges.  It then seeks to understand the relevance of the decision 
and any lessons that can be learned from it.  
II BACKGROUND 
A Factual context 
The facts leading up to the criminal proceedings against the Italian marines in 
respect of the deaths of the Indian fishermen are outlined at the start of this case 
note.  In May 2012, Kerala State Police filed charges against the marines under ss 
302, 307 and 437, read with s 34, of the Indian Penal Code (‘IPC’) and s 3 of the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against Safety of Maritime Navigation and Fixed 
Platforms on Continental Shelf Act (‘SUA’).  Italy also commenced criminal 
proceedings against the marines under Italian law.  
In March 2012, the Italian Consul General filed a writ petition on behalf of Italy 
claiming that, because the marines had acted in an official capacity, Italy had 
exclusive jurisdiction and could claim sovereign immunity.9  Italy sought a 
declaration that any criminal proceedings by India or Kerala in relation to the 
incident would be illegal and ultra vires arts 14 and 21 of the Constitution of 
India.  Article 14 requires India to give all persons equal protection before the 
law.  Article 21 prevents India from depriving any person of their liberty, except 
according to law.  Italy also sought the release of the marines into its custody.  
In May 2012, the Kerala High Court declined to make such a declaration and 
rejected Italy’s argument that it had exclusive jurisdiction.  Instead, the Court 
found that Kerala had jurisdiction up to 200 nautical miles from the Indian coast.  
In turn, Italy lodged a writ in the Supreme Court of India appealing the decision.  
The arguments made by Italy and India are set out below.  Before moving to the 
                                               
8  Michael Kirby, ‘India & Australia: A Neglected Legal Relationship and a Plan of Action’ 
(Paper presented at Indo Australian Public Policy Conference, New Delhi, India, 23-24 
October 1996). 
9  From enquiries made of a practitioner and academic in India, it appears that Italy had standing 
in the matter because of the sovereign immunity arguments made.   
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legal arguments, it is worth noting the socio-political context in which the case 
has unfolded.  
 
B Socio-political context 
The competing claims to jurisdiction between India and Italy has caused tension 
between the two nations and attracted the ‘attention of the press, public and 
politicians’,10 with media reports describing the competing claims as a 
‘diplomatic crisis’.11  The subtext of the media reporting reveals an inherent 
suspicion by each nation of the other’s legal system, and a sense in some sections 
of the Indian public that the Italian government does not take seriously the death 
of the two Indian fishermen.  From the Italian perspective, concerns have been 
expressed as to the conditions in which the marines are detained, the nature of the 
charges they will face, and whether or not the death penalty will apply.  As  
Gandhi asks, ‘[c]ould the entire process leading to the trial of the Italian Marines 
in India be criticised as a wasteful exercise that only facilitated the straining of the 
relations between two otherwise friendly countries?’12   He goes on to suggest 
that:  
Law has its own limitations in settling disputes in an adversarial setting.  Yet, 
diplomacy can work towards finding an acceptable solution where both Italy and 
India can mutually benefit … Where the limits of the law are exhausted, it is for 
the [sic] diplomacy to mend friendly relations so that desired results may be 
achieved.13  
Although this is not the first time that fishermen have been killed by anti-piracy 
forces,14 it is the first time such an incident has been the subject of so much public 
and judicial scrutiny.  In this context, it is likely that senior officials from both 
countries are under domestic pressure to appear strong in responding to the issues 
arising out of the incident.  Setting aside the question of the limitations of the law 
in furthering international relations, which is beyond the scope of this short case 
note, the respective legal arguments made by Italy and India are now considered.  
III ARGUMENTS BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA 
                                               
10  Dilip Rao, Italian Marines v Union of India (17 March 2013) The Bar 
<http://centreright.in/2013/03/italian-marines-v-union-of-india/ >. 
11  Italy and India in Diplomatic Crisis (15 May 2013) Asia Sentinel 
<http://www.asiasentinel.com/politics/italy-and-india-in-diplomatic-crisis/ >. 
12  Gandhi, above n 3, 25. 
13  Ibid.  
14  A 2012 media report suggests that: 
At least eight fishermen from India and Yemen have been killed since 2008 by soldiers 
assigned to deter pirates or by guards responsible for keeping ship cargos and crews 
safe, according to government documents. Another Indian fisherman died in July when 
sailors on the USNS Rappahannock, a U.S. naval supply ship, opened fire on a vessel off 
the coast of Dubai. 
Alan Katz, Brother Shot Dead Fishing Tests Armed Guards (29 November 2012) 
Accountability - Bloomberg News (Online) <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-11-
29/brother-shot-dead-fishing-tests-armed-guards-accountability.html>. 
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A Italy 
The arguments made by Italy centred on three key themes:  
1. The incident occurred between two nation-states, so the state of Kerala 
had no jurisdiction.  
2. The incident occurred in a place where India has sovereign rights, not 
sovereignty, and therefore, any assertion of jurisdiction by India was contrary to 
UNCLOS and general principles of international law. 
3. The marines were carrying out official functions, and therefore, Italy had 
exclusive jurisdiction.  
These three key themes are explored in further detail below.  
1. Kerala had no jurisdiction 
Italy argued that, as the incident occurred between two nation-states, it was 
governed by principles of international law, including comity and sovereign 
equality between nation-states.  It further argued that, where the conduct of 
another nation is concerned, only a central federal level of government can take 
any action.  It also argued that India’s sovereign rights in relation to its 
relationship with Italy were not able to be delegated to the state government of 
Kerala because no legal relationship exists between Italy and Kerala.15  This 
argument may interest nation who adopt a federal system of governance, such as 
Australia, the United States and Canada, particularly as state governments in those 
nations have direct trade and tourism relationships with other countries and 
varying degrees of autonomy from federal decision-making.  However, the most 
complex and comprehensive argument made by Italy was that India had no 
jurisdiction.  
2. India had no jurisdiction 
By way of background, under UNCLOS, the maritime areas adjacent to a nations-
state are divided into three key zones: the territorial waters up to 12 nautical 
miles, the contiguous zone up to 24 nautical miles, and the exclusive economic 
zone (‘EEZ’) up to 200 nautical miles.  Nations have varying rights in the three 
zones.  Beyond the zones are the high seas, over which no nation can assert 
sovereignty.  As noted at the outset, the incident occurred approximately 20.5 
nautical miles from the coast of India, and so outside its territorial waters, but 
within its contiguous zone and EEZ.  Section 188A of the Indian Code of 
Criminal Procedure (‘CCrP’), in conjunction with s 7(7) of the Maritime Zones 
Act 1976 (‘MZA’), provides that when an offence is committed by any person in 
India’s EEZ, that person may be dealt with in any place in which he is found or in 
any other place as the central government of India may direct.16  
                                               
15  Indian Fishermen Case, Supreme Court of India, Civil Original Jurisdiction, Writ Petition 
(Civil) No 135 of 2012, 14-15 [14]-[15].  
16  In 1981, India extended s 188A CCrP to the EEZ pursuant to s 7(7) MZA. 
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Italy argued that because the incident occurred outside territorial waters, but 
within the contiguous zone and EEZ, it occurred in a place where the central 
government of India had sovereign rights, but not sovereignty.  It further argued 
that the sovereign rights were limited by UNCLOS to issues such as immigration, 
customs, trafficking, and exploration, protection and exploitation of natural 
resources,17 but did not extend to the incident in question.  Rather, under 
UNCLOS, Italy, as the flag state of the M V Enrica Lexie, had a pre-emptive right 
to try the marines, and an assertion of jurisdiction by India would negate the right 
of innocent passage.18 However, this latter point was either confused in translation 
or misconceived, because the right of innocent passage applies only in territorial 
waters and is a more restricted right for vessels, than is the freedom of navigation 
which applies in the EEZ.  In any event, Italy argued that s 188A was inconsistent 
UNCLOS.  
To address the inconsistency, Italy argued that, according to the law of India, once 
a convention is ratified, the domestic law on similar issues should be construed in 
harmony with the convention, unless there is express provisions to the contrary.19  
Further, any principle of concurrent jurisdiction that may otherwise have been 
recognised as part of public international law is displaced by the express 
provisions of UNCLOS.20  Italy argued that India is bound by UNCLOS, and that 
UNCLOS recognises the primacy of flag state jurisdiction.  Also, whilst 
acknowledging that the ‘permissive’ approach to jurisdiction taken in the Lotus 
Case21 continues to be good law, Italy argued there was an exception to the extent 
                                               
17  Indian Fishermen Case, Supreme Court of India, Civil Original Jurisdiction, Writ Petition 
(Civil) No 135 of 2012, 40 [45]. UNCLOS art 56 provides:  
56. Rights, jurisdiction and duties of the coastal State in the exclusive economic zone  
1. In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State has: 
(a) sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and 
managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters 
superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil, and with regard to other 
activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the 
production of energy from the water, currents and winds; 
(b) jurisdiction as provided for in the relevant provisions of this Convention with regard 
to: 
(i) the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures; 
(ii) marine scientific research; 
(iii) the protection and preservation of the marine environment; 
(c) other rights and duties provided for in this Convention. 
2. In exercising its rights and performing its duties under this Convention in the exclusive 
economic zone, the coastal State shall have due regard to the rights and duties of other 
States and shall act in a manner compatible with the provisions of this Convention. 
3. The rights set out in this article with respect to the seabed and subsoil shall be exercised 
in accordance with.  
18  UNCLOS arts 17, 58(1), 87.  
19  Italy cited Maganbhai Ishwarbhai Patel v Union of India (1970) 3 SCC 400 as authority for 
the proposition that unless there is a law in conflict with the treaty, a treaty must stand, and the 
decision in Vishaka and Others v State of Rajasthan (1997) 6 SCC 241 as authority for 
proposition that international conventions and norms are to be read into constitutional rights 
that are absent in domestic law, so long as there is no inconsistency with such domestic law. 
20  UNCLOS arts 91-92, 94, 97.  
21  The decision of the Permanent Court of International Justice in the Lotus Case recognised a 
presumption in favour extraterritoriality, in the absence of any prohibitive rule, stating:  
Far from laying down a general prohibition to the effect that States may not extend the 
application of their laws and the jurisdiction of their courts to persons, property and acts 
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the approach is overridden by art 97 UNCLOS.  Article 97 provides that in the 
event of a collision or any other incident of navigation concerning a ship on the 
high seas, no penal or disciplinary proceedings may be instituted against a person 
except before a judicial or administrative authority either of the flag state or the 
nation-state of which the a person is a national.22  Therefore, Italy argued that it 
had the pre-emptive and exclusive jurisdiction to try the marines.  
3. Italy had exclusive jurisdiction  
To further support its argument of exclusive jurisdiction, Italy referred the Court 
to a note verbale issued by the Embassy of Italy in New Delhi.23  This document 
asserted the conduct of the marines had ‘been carried out in the fulfilment of their 
official duties in accordance with national regulations’ and ‘reassert[ed] the Italian 
jurisdiction in respect of the said military personnel’ on the basis that ‘the conduct 
of Italian Navy Military Personnel officially acting in the performance of their 
duties should not be open to judgment or scrutiny in front of any court other than 
the Italian ones’. 
While there were a number of other points raised by Italy, the key ones can be 
understood in terms of the three themes set out above.  India’s response also 
engaged with these key themes. India’s arguments are considered below.  
B India 
India considered that the case before the Supreme Court involved two key issues.  
The first was whether the Indian courts had territorial jurisdiction to try the 
marines under the IPC.  The second issue was whether the marines were entitled 
to claim sovereign immunity.  The first issue essentially combines the first and 
second key themes identified in Italy’s argument, and therefore, is presented as 
such. 
                                                                                                                                
outside their territory, it leaves them in this respect a wide measure of discretion which is 
only limited to certain cases by prohibitive rules; as regards other cases, every State 
remains free to adopt the principles which it regards as best and most suitable.  
Lotus Case (Judgment) [1927] PCIJ (ser A) No 10., 19. 
22  UNCLOS art 97 provides: 
97. Penal jurisdiction in matters of collision or any other incident of navigation  
1. In the event of a collision or any other incident of navigation concerning a ship on the 
high seas, involving the penal or disciplinary responsibility of the master or of any other 
person in the service of the ship, no penal or disciplinary proceedings may be instituted 
against such person except before the judicial or administrative authorities either of the 
flag State or of the State of which such person is a national. 
2. In disciplinary matters, the State which has issued a master's certificate or a certificate 
of competence or licence shall alone be competent, after due legal process, to pronounce 
the withdrawal of such certificates, even if the holder is not a national of the State which 
issued them. 
3. No arrest or detention of the ship, even as a measure of investigation, shall be ordered 
by any authorities other than those of the flag State. 
23  Reproduced in the Indian Fishermen Case, Supreme Court of India, Civil Original Jurisdiction, 
Writ Petition (Civil) No 135 of 2012, 50-53 [44].  
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1 Kerala had jurisdiction 
In responding to Italy’s argument that Kerala did not have jurisdiction, India 
argued that Kerala’s courts derived jurisdiction from the CCrP, a federal Act of 
Parliament, which had been extended to the EEZ by the MZA as noted above.  
However, from a reading of the judgment, most of India’s arguments focused on 
the question of the jurisdiction of India as a federal unit.   
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2 India had jurisdiction 
In responding to Italy’s argument that art 97 UNCLOS granted jurisdiction over 
the incident to Italy, India argued that art 97 did not apply to the incident.  This 
was because art 97 expressly refers to collisions or ‘any other incident of 
navigation’, and homicides are neither collisions nor incidents of navigation.  As 
to Italy’s argument that extension of the CCrP to the EEZ by the MZA was 
inconsistent with UNCLOS, India argued that it was not inconsistent, and that 
even if it was, the laws of India prevail over UNCLOS in Indian courts.  While 
India conceded that an attempt should be made to harmonise the MZA with 
UNCLOS, it argued that, if this was not possible and the provisions conflicted, the 
MZA must prevail.  Further, the extension of the CCrP to the EEZ by the MZA 
occurred in 1981, before India ratified UNCLOS in 1982, and therefore, India 
argued the extension was not subject to UNCLOS.  India also argued that art 27 
UNCLOS24 was not part of India’s domestic law.  
Another argument by India was that, in any event, the relevant voyage was not 
that of the M V Enrica Lexie, but rather that of St Antony, the Indian boat that the 
fisherman were on, and therefore, India should have jurisdiction.  The offences set 
out in the IPC apply to ‘any citizen of India in any place without or beyond India 
or to any person on any ship or aircraft registered in India, wherever it may be.’  
                                               
24  UNCLOS art 27 provides: 
27. Criminal jurisdiction on board a foreign ship 
1. The criminal jurisdiction of the coastal State should not be exercised on board a foreign 
ship passing through the territorial sea to arrest any person or to conduct any 
investigation in connection with any crime committed on board the ship during its 
passage, save only in the following cases: 
(a) if the consequences of the crime extend to the coastal State; 
(b) if the crime is of a kind to disturb the peace of the country or the good order of the 
territorial sea; 
(c) if the assistance of the local authorities has been requested by the master of the ship 
or by a diplomatic agent or consular officer of the flag State; or 
(d) if such measures are necessary for the suppression of illicit traffic in narcotic drugs 
or psychotropic substances. 
2. The above provisions do not affect the right of the coastal State to take any steps 
authorized by its laws for the purpose of an arrest or investigation on board a foreign 
ship passing through the territorial sea after leaving internal waters. 
3. In the cases provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2, the coastal State shall, if the master so 
requests, notify a diplomatic agent or consular officer of the flag State before taking any 
steps, and shall facilitate contact between such agent or officer and the ship's crew. In 
cases of emergency this notification may be communicated while the measures are 
being taken. 
4. In considering whether or in what manner an arrest should be made, the local authorities 
shall have  due regard to the interests of navigation. 
5. Except as provided in Part XII or with respect to violations of laws and regulations 
adopted in accordance with Part V, the coastal State may not take any steps on board a 
foreign ship passing through the territorial sea to arrest any person or to conduct any 
investigation in connection with any crime committed before the ship entered the 
territorial sea, if the ship, proceeding from a foreign port, is only passing through the 
territorial sea without entering internal waters. 
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The word ‘offence’ was said to include every act committed outside India, which, 
if committed in India, would constitute an offence.25 
As noted above, Italy also argued that the incident fell outside the scope of the 
permissible categories of jurisdiction to which India was entitled, such as those 
under art 56 UNCLOS, including fishing rights and other exploitation of natural 
resources.  In response, India argued that legislation for the purpose of protecting 
fishing rights would include legislation for the safety and security of Indian 
fishermen.26  However, even if it could be assumed that the rights were beyond 
those indicated in UNCLOS, such a conflict would have to be resolved on the 
basis of equity and in the light of all the circumstances.  Even if both Italy and 
India had jurisdiction, India argued that it was more convenient and appropriate 
for the trial to be conducted in India, having regard to the location of the incident 
and nature of the evidence and witnesses.27  In any event, according to India, art 
59 UNCLOS,28 in expressly recognising that there will be circumstances where 
UNCLOS does not resolve all questions of jurisdiction, permits nation-states to 
assert rights or jurisdiction beyond those specifically provided.  It followed, 
therefore, that Italy’s argument on exclusive jurisdiction was not supported by the 
provisions of UNCLOS.29  India also argued that the Lotus Case continued to be 
good law and that under the passive personality principle, nations may claim 
jurisdiction to try an individual where actions might have affected nationals of the 
nation. 
3 Italy did not have exclusive jurisdiction 
As to Italy’s argument that the actions of the marines were an act of state, and 
therefore, protected by sovereign immunity, India agreed on the existence of a 
rule of sovereign immunity, but argued each country is to determine the bounds of 
such immunity for itself.  Given that the relevant provisions in the IPC begin with 
the words ‘every person’, under Indian law all offenders are punishable.  India 
supported this point by reference to the fact that it does not adopt any policy of 
giving immunity to foreign armed forces under status-of-force agreements.  In any 
event, India argued that the actions of the marines were not acta jure imperii, the 
public acts of a nation-state, but instead were acta res gestionis, activities of a 
commercial nature that are not immune from the jurisdiction of local courts.  This 
was a difficult argument to make given that the marines were acting on the 
                                               
25  Indian Fishermen Case, Supreme Court of India, Civil Original Jurisdiction, Writ Petition 
(Civil) No 135 of 2012, 67 [59].  
26  Ibid 72 [62].  
27  Ibid 73 [63].  
28  UNCLOS art 59 provides: 
59. Basis for the resolution of conflicts regarding the attribution of rights and jurisdiction in the 
exclusive economic zone: 
In cases where this Convention does not attribute rights or jurisdiction to the coastal 
State or to other States within the exclusive economic zone, and a conflict arises 
between the interests of the coastal State and any other State or States, the conflict 
should be resolved on the basis of equity and in the light of all the relevant 
circumstances, taking into account the respective importance of the interests involved 
to the parties as well as to the international community as a whole. 
29  Indian Fishermen Case, Supreme Court of India, Civil Original Jurisdiction, Writ Petition 
(Civil) No 135 of 2012, 77 [65]. 
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mandate of the Italian Parliament and were not subject to the orders of the Master 
on the ship.  
Kerala was also a respondent in the case, and it argued that its officers were 
exercising jurisdiction as provided in the IPC and CCrP.  Kerala reiterated India’s 
argument that in the case of conflict between a treaty or a convention and a 
domestic law, the latter shall always prevail, except in defined circumstances.30   
IV DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA: THE FINDINGS 
Judgment in the Indian Fishermen Case was given by two judges, Chief Justice 
Altamas Kabir and Justice Chelameswar.  The findings of each are considered 
below.  
A Chief Justice Altamas Kabir 
In the view of Kabir CJ, the key issues in the case could be summarised as 
follows:  
Two issues, both relating to jurisdiction, fall for determination in this case.  While 
the first issue concerns the jurisdiction of the Kerala state Police to investigate the 
incident of shooting of the two Indian fishermen on board their fishing vessel, the 
second issue, which is wider in its import, in view of the Public International Law, 
involves the question as to whether the Courts of the Republic of Italy or the Indian 
Courts have jurisdiction to try the accused.31 
On the first issue, the question as to whether Kerala had jurisdiction in the matter, 
Kabir CJ found that it did not.  His Honour found that the incident had occurred 
not within the territorial waters of Kerala, but rather within the contiguous zone, 
over which Kerala has no jurisdiction.32  In considering the argument that the 
extension of s 188A of the CCrP to the EEZ vested the Kerala State Police with 
jurisdiction to investigate the incident, Kabir CJ held as follows: 
What, in effect, is the result of such extension is that the Union of India extended 
the application of the Indian Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure to 
the Contiguous Zone, which entitled the Union of India to take cognizance of, 
investigate and prosecute persons who commit any infraction of the domestic laws 
within the Contiguous Zone.  However, such a power is not vested with the state of 
Kerala.33  
Further, in what somewhat resembled deference to the principle of comity, Kabir 
CJ noted that the marines were from the Royal Italian Navy and were on the M V 
Enrica Lexie pursuant to an Italian Decree of Parliament.  Therefore, his Honour 
observed, the dispute is taken ‘to a different level where the government between 
two countries become involved’.34  In particular, he observed that as Italy had 
already commenced proceedings against the marines, Kerala, being merely one 
                                               
30  Ibid 93 [79]. 
31  Ibid 96 [82]. 
32  Ibid 97 [84].  
33  Ibid 98 [84].  
34  Ibid 100 [86]. 
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state unit in a larger federation, would not have authority to try the accused when 
outside the state.  This seems to be a statement that only the federal central 
government may assert extraterritorial jurisdiction, and a state may not. 
On the second issue, whether the courts of Italy or India had jurisdiction to try the 
marines, his Honour found that s 7 of the MZA makes it clear that the contiguous 
zone is within the EEZ, an area adjacent to the territorial waters extending up to 
200 nautical miles from the nearest point of the baseline of the Kerala coast.  
Therefore, the laws governing the EEZ also govern incidents occurring within the 
contiguous zone.35  
His Honour rejected the argument by Italy that s 7 of the MZA was in conflict 
with arts 33, 56 or 57 UNCLOS.  Rather, he found the potential area of difference 
was between the MZA and art 97 UNCLOS, which relates to penal jurisdiction in 
matters of collision or any other incident of navigation.36  In his view, the 
question then became whether firing at the fishermen was an ‘incident of 
navigation’.  His Honour found that the expression ‘incident of navigation’ cannot 
be extended to a criminal act ‘in whatever circumstances’.37  Instead, the issue as 
to whether the accused had acted on a misunderstanding that the St Antony was a 
pirate vessel, was a matter of evidence to be established at trial.  Therefore, art 97 
did not apply, and art 100, which provides that all nation-states must cooperate to 
the fullest possible extent in the repression of piracy on the high seas, or in any 
other place outside the jurisdiction of any nation, would only apply if a trial court 
accepted that the accused had acted on that misunderstanding.38  He rejected the 
argument by India that UNCLOS permits nations to assert rights of jurisdiction 
beyond those specifically provided in it. 39  However, he did find that:  
[W]hile India is entitled both under its Domestic Law and the Public International 
Law to exercise rights of sovereignty up to 24 nautical miles from the baseline of 
the basis of which the width of Territorial Waters is measured, it can exercise only 
sovereign rights within the Exclusive Economic Zone for certain purposes.  The 
incident … having occurred within the Contiguous Zone, the Union of India is 
entitled to prosecute the two Italian marines under the criminal justice system.40 
He further found that such a prosecution ‘has to be conducted only at the level of 
the Federal or Central Government and cannot be the subject matter of a 
proceeding initiated by a Provincial/state Government’.41   
Ultimately, Kabir CJ held that, until it is accepted that the provisions of art 100, 
relating to cooperation on piracy, apply to the facts of this case, it is India that has 
jurisdiction to proceed with the investigation and trial.  To that end, his Honour 
directed India, in consultation with the Chief Justice of India, to try the case in a 
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38  Ibid 109 [95]. 
39  Ibid 117 [99].  
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Special Court in accordance with the law of India and UNCLOS, but only where 
there was no conflict between UNCLOS and the domestic laws of India.  
B Justice Chelameswar 
Chelameswar J, agreeing with the conclusions of Kabir CJ, identified the issue as 
being the territorial limits of the authority of the sovereign to make laws and 
enforce them.42  His Honour noted that art 1 of the Constitution of India defines 
the geographical territory of India and art 297 defines maritime territory.  In so 
doing, his Honour observed a lack of clarity on the extent of territorial waters, 
stating: 
[T]hat the sovereignty of a ‘coastal State’ extends to its territorial waters, is also a 
well-accepted principle of International Law, though there is no uniformly shared 
legal norm establishing the limit of the territorial waters – maritime territory.  
Whether the maritime territory is also a part of the national territory of the State is 
a question on which difference of opinion exists.43  
However, despite defining the parameters of the issues as being territorial, his 
Honour also acknowledged the issue of extraterritoriality.  For example, he 
referred to article 245(2) of the Constitution of India, which expressly declares 
that ‘[n]o law made by Parliament shall be deemed to be invalid on the ground 
that it would have extra-territorial operation’.  The point Chelameswar J seems to 
make is that this article functions as a limit on the jurisdiction of the courts to 
declare a law invalid or to decline to give effect to a law on the grounds that it 
extends extraterritorially,44 regardless of competing jurisdictional claims.  His 
Honour then went on to acknowledge why nation States may seek to assert 
extraterritorial jurisdiction as follows: 
The increased complexity of modern life emanating from the advanced technology 
and travel facilities and the large cross border commerce made it possible to 
commit crimes whose effects are felt in territories beyond the residential borders of 
the offenders.45 
Chelameswar J then considered the relationship between extraterritorial rights and 
extraterritorial responsibility.  For example, his Honour reasoned that if 
constitutional protections in India apply to non-citizens, it follows that India must 
also have the authority to legislate extraterritorially.  He stated that: 
The protection of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution is available even to an 
alien when sought to be subjected to the legal process of this country.  This court 
on more than one occasion held so on the ground that the rights emanating from 
those two Articles are not confined only to or dependent upon the citizenship of 
this country. As a necessary concomitant, this country ought to have the authority 
to apply and enforce the laws of this country against the person and things beyond 
its territory when its legitimate interests are affected.  In assertion of such a 
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principle, various laws of this country are made applicable beyond its territory.46  
Giving examples of various legislative provisions extending extraterritorially, 
Chelameswar J stated that ‘it is amply clear that Parliament always asserted its 
authority to make laws, which are applicable to persons, who are not corporeally 
present within the territory of India (whether or not they are citizens) when such 
persons commit acts which affect the legitimate interests of this country.’47  His 
Honour then concluded: 
Therefore, I am of the opinion that the Parliament, undoubtedly, has the power to 
make and apply the law to persons, who are not citizens of India, committing acts, 
which constitute offences prescribed by the law of this country, irrespective of the 
fact that the offender is corporeally present or not within the Indian territory at the 
time of the commission of the offence.  At any rate, it is not open for any 
Municipal Court including this Court to decline to apply the law on the ground that 
the law is extra-territorial in operation when the language of the enactment clearly 
extends the application of the law.48  
What Chelameswar J gives here is a clear statement of the authority of Parliament 
India to legislate extraterritorially.  Other key findings in both judgements and the 
relevance that they may have to the broader dialogue on extraterritoriality are now 
considered.  
V BROADER RELEVANCE OF THE ARGUMENTS AND FINDINGS 
This case is relevant not merely because of the fascinating convergence of Indian 
and Italian national agendas or the complicated framework of domestic and 
international law in which it took place, but also because the decision either 
makes or illustrates a number of key points.  
First, both India and Italy seemed to accept that Lotus Case is still good law.  This 
is in the context of considerable academic criticism to the effect that it does not 
adequately regulate competing claims to jurisdiction or account for any hierarchy 
of claims.  This is so even though India and Italy are not part of any common 
regional body and do not come from a common legal heritage, India being a 
common law country and Italy being a civil law country.  
Second, the decision and surrounding media reports illustrate the tensions that 
competing claims to jurisdiction can cause.  It underscores the need for clearer 
guidance on resolving competing claims to jurisdiction and for better articulation 
of the principles of jurisdiction in international law.  The provisions of UNCLOS 
did not necessarily bring any clarity.  The closest the Supreme Court of India 
came to articulating any guidance was to state that ‘(c)rimes should be dealt with 
by the States whose social order is most closely affected.’49  It did not pose any 
criteria by which such an affect would be measured or compared.  
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Third, for nation-states with an active interest in deterring acts of piracy, the 
incident in question is a lesson in managing relationships with coastal states 
whose territory is adjacent to common maritime routes.  Concerns about 
international piracy and European commercial ventures may not carry the same 
weight with people who do not share common cultures or wealth.  Further, 
findings by the Supreme Court such as that India is entitled to exercise ‘rights of 
sovereignty’50 over contiguous zones, India has sovereign rights, but not 
sovereignty, over EEZs,51 and UNCLOS does not permit nations to assert rights of 
jurisdiction beyond those specifically provided in it,52 will contribute to the debate 
on interpretation of articles in UNCLOS concerned with jurisdiction and sovereign 
rights in contiguous zones and EEZs. Notably, a finding by Chelameswar J, that 
article 97, which is in Part VII UNCLOS, applies only to that part of the sea not 
included in EEZs zone or territorial waters, and has no application to the EEZs,53 
may provokes a reaction from scholars of UNCLOS. This is because art 58 
expressly provides that arts 88-116, which are also in Part VII, do apply in EEZs, 
as long as they are not incompatible with Part V. 
Fourth, the decision and the incident itself may be instructive for countries that, 
like India, have borders adjacent to maritime routes and a system of governance 
that divides power between state and central governments.  For example, 
countries such as Australia, Canada and the United States all have maritime 
borders and a federal system of government, in which actions of states may be an 
affront to international partners not accustomed to federalism.  
Notably, other than some passing references by Chelameswar J and India, the 
choice by both the judges and the parties to conceptualise the dispute as 
competing claims to territorial jurisdiction, rather than considering other grounds 
of extraterritorial jurisdiction, such as active or passive personality or the 
protective principle,54 indicates an acceptance of the primacy of territorial 
jurisdiction and/or a lack of understanding or engagement with the principles of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction under international law.  Notwithstanding that, Italy 
and India and Kabir CJ all alluded, in their own way, to principles of comity and, 
as noted above, all accepted the decision in the Lotus Case as good law.  
VI CONCLUSION 
At the time of writing, the legal and political issues arising out of the Indian 
Fishermen Case have yet to be resolved.  Notwithstanding that, the arguments of 
Italy, India and Kerala and the finding of the Supreme Court of India are still 
instructive.  This is because the decision illustrates the legal and diplomatic 
complexities in resolving competing claims to jurisdiction.  It also suggests that 
coastal states operating under federal systems need to manage their interactions 
with foreign nation-states carefully, and that anti-piracy measures may be in need 
of better management.  The decision also engages with some of the more 
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technical aspects of UNCLOS, which, if not resolved to the relative satisfaction of 
both India and Italy, may end up before an international tribunal.  While this 
particular decision is largely concerned with the specific issues of coastal state 
jurisdiction and with the fallout from anti-piracy operations, the decision points to 
a broader theme.  This theme is that, in an increasingly interconnected world, 
where individuals have greater mobility and the media cycle is rapid and far-
reaching, the international community must continue to navigate its way to a 
better articulation of legal principles for resolving competing jurisdictional 
claims.  
